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Abstract 
Raising equity capital via Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) has been rising in 
popularity matching Seasoned Equity Offerings. We use over 10,000 PIPEs in a global setting (37 
countries) during 1995-2015 to assess how institutional characteristics affect the LVVXHUV¶
performance. We document a significant decline in the market reaction, especially during 2004-
2015, and find that firms issuing equity via PIPEs have significantly worse fundamentals and 
negative long-term performance globally. Finally, consistent with the law and finance literature, 
we show that country governance matters, as issuing firms operating in countries with better 
regulatory quality and higher law enforcement outperform others.  
 
Keywords: Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE), stock performance, cross-country 
differences, corporate governance, regulation. 
JEL classification: G15, G18, G38 
 
 
1 Strathclyde Business School, University of Strathclyde, 199 Cathedral Street, Glasgow, G4 0QU, UK 
(email: d.andriosopoulos@strath.ac.uk). 
2 Corresponding author. Strathclyde Business School, University of Strathclyde, 199 Cathedral Street, 
Glasgow, G4 0QU, UK (email: styliani.panetsidou@strath.ac.uk).  
 
 
 
*We thank Christian Andres, Andrew Marshall, Patrick McColgan, Krishna Paudyal, Steve Young, David 
McMillan, Chris Brooks, Alasdair Steele and participants at the 2017 and 2018 annual FEBS meeting, the 
2018 annual BAFA conference, and the 2017 TIJA meeting for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
All remaining errors are our own. 
  
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
The time efficient manner and low issuance costs1 of Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) 
has led to the emergence of PIPEs as an alternative way of raising capital. The capital raised via 
PIPEs is non-trivial. For instance, during 2001 to 2015 firms in the US raised approximately $243 
billion via PIPEs, similar to circa $240 billion raised by similarly sized firms in US Seasoned 
Equity Offerings (SEOs) (Lim, Schwert and Weisbach, 2018). PIPEs have become a popular 
funding choice in the US since the early 1990s and surpassed SEOs in dollar volume and number 
of transactions during 1996-2006 in the US (Chen et al., 2010). Meanwhile, the rest of the world 
is catching up with PIPEs. For instance, during 2005 to 2015 the average annual deal value is $46 
bn in the US, $29 bn in Asia and $35 bn in Europe, illustrating the increasing popularity of PIPEs 
for raising equity capital. Though, market frictions such as regulations and institutional 
frameworks can drive firms away from efficient investment and resource allocation which also 
inhibits economic growth and development (John and Senbet, 1998). In this paper we evaluate the 
market performance of PIPE issuing firms around the world and assess how varying institutional 
characteristics affect market valuation.  
³)LJXUHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
It is well established in the literature, that US firms issuing private equity are followed by a 
positive short-term market valuation and a long-term underperformance (Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck 
and Rees, 2002), similar to the behavior found in public equity placements (Loughran and Ritter, 
1995; Ritter, 1991). Since PIPE issuing firms typically have high information asymmetries 
                                                 
1The transaction can be executed quickly as the issuer can close the deal and receive the funds without going through 
a time consuming SEC review in the case of US issues, or without the need to publish a prospectus upon satisfying 
certain criteria relative to the country of issue in non-US markets. In addition, PIPE issuing firms have the option to 
negotiate directly with the purchaser, which reduces the direct offering costs (Chen, Dai and Schatzberg, 2010; Dresner 
and Kim, 2010). 
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(Hertzel and Smith, 1993), the initial positive market reaction is attributed to the certification effect 
of informed investors participating in PIPEs (Floros, Nagarajan and Sivaramakrishnan, 2017; 
Hertzel and Smith, 1993) and the subsequent rise in the likelihood of an increase in firm value due 
to the enhanced monitoring (Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan, 2007; Dai, 2007; Wruck, 1989).  
Moreover, WKHOHYHORILQYHVWRUV¶PRQLWRULQJGLIIHUVDFURVVFRXQWULHV due to the varying market 
frictions, regulatory frameworks and law enforcement along with WKH UHVSHFWLYH VKDUHKROGHUV¶
rights. For instance, cross-FRXQWU\GLIIHUHQFHVDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQG ILUPV¶
ability to raise external capital (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; El Ghoul, Guedhami and 
Kim, 2017). Meanwhile, the structure of the law and the quality of its enforcement are potential 
determinants of the rights that security holders have and how well these rights are protected (La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997,1998). Also, the legal and business 
HQYLURQPHQWV DUH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLQJ FKRLFHV DQG SHUIRUPDQFH (Himmelberg, 
+XEEDUG DQG /RYH  .ODSSHU DQG /RYH  /D 3RUWD /RSH]ဨ'Hဨ6LODQHV 6KOHLIHU DQG
Vishny, 2002; Lombardo and Pagano, 2000). Furthermore, a strong legal environment is 
associated with fair valuation in private equity contracts (Cumming and Johan, 2013), contractual 
agreements (Jandik and Kali, 2009) and the contracting evaluation process since the information 
presented on financial reports is more reliable for due diligence in high law enforcement 
environments. But, this is contrary to weak law enforcement environments where investors are 
more likely to depend on personal contacts to acquire information (Cumming, Fleming and 
Schwienbacher, 2006; Cumming and Walz, 2009).  
We argue that the variation in raising capital via PIPEs and the respective investor monitoring 
and certification effects differ across countries. For instance, better legal protection will limit 
financing frictions and LQYHVWRUV¶IHDUVRISURILWH[SURSULDtion, thereby, increasing firm value. After 
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all, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2011) argue that stronger legal protection should mitigate 
financing frictions, which is supported by Kusnadi and Wei (2011) who find an inverse relation 
between legal protection and cash flow sensitivity and highlight that country-level factors 
influence corporate financial policies. A first indication of this variation in PIPE activity is shown 
by the fact that despite the growing popularity of PIPEs in the US, PIPE issues are not as frequent 
in the rest of the world. For instance, the US is the most active market on PIPEs (19,566 deals) 
followed by the rest of the Americas excluding the US, (8,980 deals) and Asia (5,922) with Europe 
lagging with a lower number of deals (2,929)2. We investigate how different regulatory 
frameworks across countries affect the short and long-term market valuation of more than 10,000 
PIPE issues around the world, between 1995 and 2015; covering the universe of PIPE issues of 
that period. We explore the effects of public governance factors such as country level governance, 
law enforcement, corruption and legal structures on the performance of PIPEs. In addition, since 
our study captures the period from the beginning of PIPEs we are able to document whether short 
and long-term valuations of PIPEs persist over time. 
Consistent with the evidence on equity issues (Hertzel et al., 2002; Ritter, 1991) and US PIPEs 
(e.g. Lim et al. (2018)) we find a positive market reaction to PIPE announcements in the US. 
However, we document a negative market valuation in non-US regions. In addition, we find that 
the short-term market valuation of PIPEs across the full sample has a downward shift, while the 
average announcement returns for US PIPEs fall by almost 138% during the last decade3. 
Following PIPE announcements, firms exhibit a poor long-run market performance across all 
                                                 
2
 These numbers represent the total PIPE issues reported in Placement Tracker database and therefore are higher than 
the final sample that excludes firms that do not satisfy the sample selection criteria applied in this paper. Table 1 
provides a detailed description of the dataset collection process. 
3
 The average announcement returns of US PIPEs (including all contract types) fall from -1.60% during 1995-2015 to 
-0.61% during 2006-2015. 
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countries. This suggests that our findings are not the result of model specification, data sample, 
sample period, or sample size bias. More, importantly, we find that regulatory frameworks and 
quality matter. For instance, a 1% increase in Regulatory Quality and Control for Corruption is 
associated with an increase of 8% and 6% in the announcement returns respectively, even after 
controlling for other firm- and issue-specific factors. This confirms our expectation that better 
shareholder protection and more robust legal environments, limit wealth expropriation fears and 
positively affect the monitoring and certification effect that drive the market valuation of PIPEs. 
In addition, our findings are consistent with the literature indicating a positive relationship between 
legal environment quality and economic outcomes in terms of corporate valuations, economic 
growth, market development (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; La Porta et al., 2002), firm profitability 
and equity returns (Hooper, Sim and Uppal, 2009; Lombardo and Pagano, 2000).  
We further assess several potential factors for the negative shift in PIPEs market reaction and 
the variation in returns in different countries, including the impact of the recent financial crisis, 
issue characteristics, firmV¶ fundamentals and institutional country characteristics. We find that 
firms raising capital through PIPEs around the world, from 2004 onwards, have significantly worse 
fundamentals in terms of size, profitability and operating performance. We further find that smaller 
discounts lead to a better market valuation and we find consistent differences in the levels of 
performance of PIPE issuing firms.  
Our contribution to the literature is fourfold. First, we provide the first to our knowledge global 
study of the market valuation of PIPEs, extending our knowledge on the behavior and implications 
of this equity funding choice. Khanna and Palepu (2010) argue that institutions vary amongst both 
emerging and developed economies, in line with Djankov, Mcliesh and Shleifer (2007) who argue 
that there are systematic differences in the effectiveness of institutions across countries in different 
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levels of economic development. Second, we provide evidence that the regulatory frameworks, 
which influence LQYHVWRUV¶PRQLWRULQJDQGFHUWLIication effects, are economically and statistically 
significant in their impact on the market valuation of PIPEs. Third, by extending our analysis to a 
global setting we confirm previous US-based evidence and the persistence of stock anomalies by 
assessing whether the long-term price anomalies following PIPE issues persist. Therefore, we 
alleviate any concerns of potential dissapearance of market anomalies over time (Schwert, 2003), 
or that previous evidence in the literature can be sensitive to the time periods (Fu and Huang, 2016) 
and the methods used since, a way to mitigate these concerns is to use a different dataset (Fama, 
1998) and a large country coverage (Djankov et al. (2007). Fourth, we find structured PIPEs in 
their vast majority to systematically underperform compared with traditional PIPEs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the legal and regulatory 
framework of PIPEs and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the collection of the data 
and the methods used. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1 Regulatory Framework of Private Investments in Public Equity 
PIPEs typically fall in two broad categories, traditional and structured. In traditional PIPEs, 
investors acquire common stock or fixed convertibles, while structured PIPEs have more complex 
contract terms, usually based on floating price convertibles. The rules that apply on PIPEs vary 
across the world. In the US, although security offerings are required to be registered with the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), PIPEs are not required to undergo the same regulatory 
review process and can be exempt of a registration statement4. Since there is no SEC review 
                                                 
4
 Based on Regulation D, Rule 506 Section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933, a company has an exemption of registration 
statement when satisfying the following criteria: i) the company does not engage in any general solicitation to market 
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required, the transaction is executed quickly ± even within seven days ± thus making PIPEs a time 
efficient method of raising capital. Investors are still restricted from reselling or short-selling their 
shares until the registration statement receives approval (approximately 120 days). Due to this 
restriction5, investors are compensated with large discounts, that are on average 5 to 6 times higher 
than those received on SEOs (Chen et al., 2010). 
In the European market unlike the US, there are no specific rules for PIPEs. The companies and 
investors interested in PIPEs will have to conform to the main rules applying to all listed companies 
in Europe. The specific rules of the corresponding market may also affect the PIPE issue. For 
instance, companies traded on regulated markets such as the Euronext or the /RQGRQ¶V 6WRFN
Exchange should follow the Prospectus (2003/71/EC) and Transparency (2013/50/EU) directives.  
However, similar to the US case, as set by Article 3(2) of Directive 2003/71/EC, an offer may be 
exempt from the obligation to publish a prospectus if the offer of securities addresses exclusively 
to qualified6 investors. The same rules apply for all EU countries, subject to each EU member 
jurisdiction.  
The takeover code together with pre-emption rights are also considered caveats for PIPEs. A 
major consideration for large PIPE deals is the mandatory offer requirement that is triggered at 
                                                 
the securities; ii) the offering is made to a specific number of accredited investors and iii) relevant information for the 
investment is made available to investors by the company. 
5
 The average restriction period during which purchasers are not allowed to resell their PIPE securities to the public 
market is approximately 120 days. A time period which is considerably lower than restrictions periods that apply to 
traditional private placements which can last up to two years (Chen et al., 2010). 
6
 As set by Article 2(1e) of Directive 2003/71/EC, the term qualified investor refers to: legal entities such as credit 
institutions, investment firms, regulated financial institutions, insurance companies, collective investment schemes 
and their management companies, pension funds and their management companies, commodity dealers or national 
and regional governments, central banks, international and supranational institutions or certain natural persons or 
SMEs, subject to mutual recognition. A member state may choose to authorise natural persons or SMEs who are 
residents or have their registered office in that member state and who expressly ask to be considered as qualified 
investors. In the US, under Rule 501 of Regulation D, the term accredited investor refers to financial institutes such 
as banks, pension funds, savings and loan associations, registered brokers or dealers, registered insurance, business 
development or investment companies, Small Business Investment Companies, directors, executive officers or general 
partners of the issuer or any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, 
exceeds $1,000,000. 
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30% in the majority of European and Asian countries, while no such regulation is in place for the 
US. Considerations for smaller deals might include the pre-emption rights which protect 
shareholders against share price dilution. In our estimations we control for all varying types of 
PIPE issues.  
2.2 3,3( ILUPV¶ EHKDYLRU OHJDO HQYLURQPHQW DQG FURVV-sectional variation in market 
valuation 
PIPEs have typically positive announcement returns followed by negative long-term performance 
(Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Dai, 2007), though this varies across 
investors (Dai, 2007), contract types (Brophy et al., 2009) and whether it is an initial or a 
successive PIPE offering (Floros and Sapp (2012). But accessing external capital markets has a 
varying degree of frictions depending on regulatory frameworks (Almeida et al., 2011; Kusnadi 
and Wei, 2011). Moreover, corporate decisions, growth and firm value are driven by governance 
quality (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003; Haider, Liu, Wang and Zhang, 2017; Liu and 
Magnan, 2011) and more efficient legal systems with better legal protection can lead to better 
outcomes in financial development /D3RUWDHWDO/D3RUWD/RSH]ဨ'Hဨ6LODQHVDQG6KOHLIHU
1999). This is because well-functioning legal systems offer better protection to outside investors 
which enables firms to raise external financing at a lower cost (La Porta et al., 2002) and leads to 
lower investment risk (Chiou, Lee and Lee, 2010). Meanwhile,  investors who enjoy only security 
benefits, are more reluctant to invest in weak legal protection countries as they expect the 
extraction of private benefits in such companies to be large (Giannetti and Simonov, 2006).  
In addition, higher legal quality systems are also reported to provide lower ex-ante investment 
uncertainty (Hail and Leuz, 2006), higher demand for equity and higher risk-adjusted returns on 
equity, either through the reduction of agency costs between managers and shareholders or simply 
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due to the improvement in firms profitability which makes companies pay higher returns to their 
shareholders (Lombardo and Pagano, 1999, 2000). Similarly, Fan, Rui and Zhao (2008) report that 
firms in countries with weak governance tend to finance their projects through debt rather than 
equity, due to the increased agency and transaction costs. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), also 
argue that weak governance induces higher agency costs and leads to lower equity returns.  
Moreover, well-functioning legal institutions may reduce the risk-premium demanded by 
investors. This view effectively reports that weak legal environments may be considered risky to 
investors and induce them to require higher risk premiums, suggesting a negative relationship 
between regulatory quality and equity returns. In fact, Low, Kew and Tee (2011) argue that 
investors associate low governance quality with higher risk. In our international setting we aim to 
assess how differences in institutional quality and law enforcement can explain the cross-sectional 
variation in the market valuation of PIPEs.  
La Porta et al. (1998) show that laws vary across countries based on few legal families and 
traditions (Watson, 1974) and argue that while there are no countries with laws exactly alike, there 
are certain similarities that allow for the classification of legal families. Specifically, common law 
countries give investors the highest legal rights while German and Scandinavian civil law countries 
have the strongest law enforcement. In contrast, French civil law countries have the weakest legal 
protection and law enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As in  La Porta 
et al. (1998) we classify PIPE issuing firms into four categories: a) English common law and b) 
French, c) German and d) Scandinavian civil law legal origin. We formulate our first hypothesis 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Country legal origins affect the market valuation of PIPEs. 
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Legal origin classification is a time invariant characteristic.  Meanwhile, firms of the same legal 
origin can still vary significantly subject to the advances of the judicial system over time (Chiou 
et al., 2010). In addition, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003) report that an important 
determinant of the effectiveness of legal institutions is the way the respective countries received 
their law, rather than the legal family they belong, which effectively leads to differences in the 
legal system between countries of the same legal origin. Therefore, we include in our analysis 
three alternative time-variant variables used as proxies for legal rights and law enforcement. As 
legal rights and law enforcement proxies we include the variables Control for Corruption, 
Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law. If a strong governance framework leads to better economic 
outcomes, higher demand for equity and higher equity valuations (Chiou et al., 2010; Fan et al., 
2008; Gompers et al., 2003; Hooper et al., 2009; La Porta et al., 1998; Lombardo and Pagano, 
1999, 2000) and thus greater transparency, investor protection and monitoring, we expect to find 
higher valuations of PIPE issuers operating in countries with better institutional quality. Moreover, 
if poor governance quality leads to increased risk valuation thereby driving investors to demand 
higher returns as compensation for the increased risk (Albuquerue and Wang, 2008; Hail and Leuz, 
2006; Harvey, 1995; Low et al., 2011), we expect a negative relationship between PIPE returns 
and governance quality. Our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: Legal institutions influence the variation in the performance of PIPE issuers. 
3. Data and summary statistics 
3.1 Data Selection 
We identify all PIPE transactions that occurred worldwide during 1995-2015, covering almost the 
entire period of PIPE issuances. Data for PIPE issuance dates and deal characteristics are collected 
from Placement Tracker of Sagient Research. Daily stock prices for US firms are collected from 
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the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and for non-US firms from Thomson Reuters7 
in local currency to avoid the potential effect of currency changes. To ensure the quality of the 
data employed from Thomson Reuters we follow a two-step cleaning process as suggested by 
Manconi et al. (2017). First we remove all non-trading days. Second, we remove stale prices due 
WRDILUP¶VGHOLVWLQJE\UHSODFLQJDOO]HURUHWXUQVZLWKPLVVLQJYDOXHVVWDUWLQJIURPWKHPRVWUHFHQW
observation up to the first non-zero observation8.  
Financial data are collected from Worldscope database in US dollars for comparability 
purposes. We start with 39,249 issues which is the universe of PIPE issues during the examined 
period. The final dataset includes data from 37 countries. Following relevant studies (Brown and 
Floros, 2012; Dai, 2007) we exclude financial firms. We further exclude all firms that trade in 
OTC and pink sheets, Depositary Receipts (DRs), Rule 144-A, Regulation S.9, secondary issues 
DQGDOO³&RQILGHQWLDOO\0DUNHWHG3XEOLF2IIHULQJV´&032/ overnight offerings and shelf-sale 
issues10. These restrictions lead to a final dataset of 93,576 firm-year observations comprising 
10,408 PIPE issuances from 4,456 unique firms in 37 countries. 
³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
PIPE deals are categorized into traditional and structured as follows. Traditional PIPEs include: 
common stock issues, common stock-rights offerings, fixed convertibles and non-convertible 
debt/preferred stocks. Structured PIPEs include: at the market offerings (ATM), common stock 
                                                 
7
 Thomson Reuters is reported in several studies to have poorer quality stock data compared to CRSP (Ince and Porter, 
2006; Manconi, Peyer and Vermaelen, 2017). Therefore, we collect US stock data from CRSP.  
8
 The returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% by country. 
9
 Following Brophy et al. (2009) we exclude issues categorised as Rule 144-A since. These securities are issued by 
larger and more mature firms and are not considered PIPEs due to different regulations. Also, we exclude Registration 
S. securities, as in Chen et al. (2010), since a registration statement is required before the issuance, which makes them 
inherently different from PIPEs. 
10
 CMPOs are publicly announced on the last day of the confidential pre-marketing of the securities allowing for retail 
investors to participate, while shelf-sale issues require an effective registration statement before the sale of the stock, 
effectively making these two security types public offerings.  
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reset issues, floating convertibles, convertible reset issues, convertible-company instalment issues 
and structured equity lines11. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents a breakdown of PIPE issues by country in our final dataset between 1995 and 
2015. Throughout the period the US have the most PIPE issues (2,747 deals) followed by Australia 
(2,495 deals) and Canada (2,411 deals). European firms exhibit a lower activity with a total number 
of 1,808 deals out of which 1,650 are issued by UK firms. Moreover, PIPE funding is not a one-
time occurrence. On average there are three PIPE issues per firm in the US and two PIPE issues 
outside the US during our sample period, with the average proceeds per firm being $90m. 
However, there is considerable variation in the average number of PIPE issues per firm and 
proceeds since in Europe the average proceeds per firm are $145m, while the average proceeds in 
the American continent (excluding the US) and the Asia-Pacific region are $36m and $69m 
respectively. 
³7DEOHJRHVabout here.´ 
Table 3 presents a breakdown of the dataset according to the region, industry, contract type and 
LVVXHUV¶OHJDORULJLQUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHPDMRULW\RIPIPE-issuing firms are based in the US and the 
Asia-Pacific region. This is also apparent in Panel D where we see that the sample is dominated 
by English common law legal origin, due to the large proportion of PIPE issuing firms being from 
the United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. Almost half of the firms are in the 
mining and constructions industry, followed by firms in the business equipment and the oil, gas 
and coal extraction industries. In addition, the vast majority of PIPE offerings classify as traditional 
PIPEs, with common stock issues being the most popular as they hold 63.5% of the total traditional 
                                                 
11
 Brophy et al. (2009) offers a detailed description of PIPE security types. 
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PIPE contracts, similar to Chen et al. (2010) and Berkman, Mckenzie and Verwijmeren (2016). In 
contrast, structured PIPEs amount to just 6.6% of the total issues and have declined in popularity 
over the years. This is possibly because of the toxic reputation these issues received due to the 
potential of price manipulation through short sales (Hillion and Vermaelen, 2004) or due to a turn 
towards issuer-friendly contracts with better investor protection terms and fewer repricing rights 
stemming from a series of SEC investigations to limit price manipulation around PIPEs in 2002 
(Bengtsson, Dai and Henson (2014). 
³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
Table 4 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of PIPE issuing firms from 1995 to 2015 for 
HDFKQDWLRQFOXVWHUHGRQWKHLVVXLQJILUPV¶UHJLRQFirms based in the Americas (excluding the 
US) have the lowest market value. Considering that most of the issuers in this region are from 
Canada, these results are consistent with &DUSHQWLHU/¶KHUDQG6XUHW who show that due to 
the light listing requirements in Canada, many small firms that are in need of relatively low 
financing are listed in the Canadian stock exchanges. US PIPE issuers have on average a higher 
market-to-book and enterprise value ratio compared to PIPE issuers from the rest of the world. We 
further present cash burn rates, as PIPE firms are reported to have an acute need for cash (Floros 
and Sapp, 2012), and find that the cash burn rates are high (negative values) especially in the 
Americas, although cash levels are similar across countries. Moreover, operating performance as 
measured by the return on assets (ROA) is negative across all regions and is in line with US 
evidence (Dai, 2007) confirming the poor financial position of these firms. However, this is 
contrary to Dahiya, Klapper, Parthasarathy and Singer (2017) who find Asian PIPE issuers to have 
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high operating performance. We argue this difference is due to the earlier sample period (2000-
2009) the authors use and their focus on PIPEs with high proceeds only12.  
Overall, we see that PIPE issuing firms are small, with high leverage, negative operating 
performance and high financing needs. Prior studies find PIPE firms to be of a distressed nature 
(Brophy et al., 2009; Chaplinsky and Haushalter, 2010), therefore in Table 4 Panel B we measure 
the default probability of PIPE issuers using two methods, the original Altman z-score (Altman, 
1968) DQGWKHILUPV¶RSHUDWLQJLQFRPH7KHILUVWFROXPQVKRZVWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIILUPVWKDWKDYH
a z-score lower than 1.8, which falls in the unsafe zone, one year prior to the PIPE issue. The 
second column shows the percentage of firms that have negative operating income during the two 
years prior to the PIPE issue. Both measures show that PIPE issuers have very high distress risk, 
a finding which is in line with the literature suggesting that PIPEs are a last resort method of raising 
capital (Brophy et al., 2009; Floros and Sapp, 2012). 
³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
4. Empirical findings 
3,3(LVVXHUV¶VWRFNSHUIRUPDQFH 
To assess the market valuation of PIPE issues around the world we use a standard event study 
methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985)  as follows: 
ܣܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ െ ߙො௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ െ ሺߚመ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ כ ܴ௠ǡ௝ǡ௧ሻ        (1) 
where ܣܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ is the abnormal return of a security i, in country j, on day t.  ܴ ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ is the logarithmic 
return of security i, in country j, on day t, the ොܽ and ߚመ  coefficients are estimated based on 250 
                                                 
12
 The authors keep only PIPE issues with proceeds higher than $1m. This criterion is relevant to their study since 
they are comparing PIPEs to SEOs, however it does not fit the purpose of our paper, in which we aim to document 
the behaviour of all PIPE issues which tend to be small in some regions. 
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trading days before day -25 relative to the announcement date and ܴ௠ǡ௝ǡ௧ is the return of the market 
m, in country j, on day t. We use as a market benchmark the CRSP value weighted market indices 
for US firms and the DataStream individual country indices for non-US firms, following global 
stock performance studies such as (Bris, 2005; Manconi et al., 2017). We measure the 
announcement returns using the window (-4, +5) days around the PIPE announcement. To measure 
the short, medium and long-term stock performance, we use the following time windows 
respectively (+6, +100), (+6, +250) and (+6, +500) days around the PIPE announcement. We 
follow the time windows used for US issues by Brophy et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2010) and Dai 
(2011) for comparability reasons. 
³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
Table 5 Panel A shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the event (-4, +5) and post-
event windows for each region and further categorized into traditional and structured PIPEs. In 
Panel B of Table 5, we re-estimate the abnormal returns over the same time windows employing 
the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) method to ensure our earlier results are not biased 
when assessing long-term returns due to ignoring compounding (Barber and Lyon, 1997). We 
estimate BHARs as follows:  
ܤܪܣܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ? ൫ ? ൅ ௜ܴǡ௝ǡ௧൯ െ  ? ሺ ? ൅ ௠ܴǡ௝ǡ௧ሻே௧ୀଵே௧ୀଵ         (2) 
where ܤܪܣܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ denotes the daily Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns of security i, in country j, 
on day t, ܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ is the logarithmic return of security i, in country j, on day t and ܴ௠ǡ௝ǡ௧ is the daily 
return of market m, in country j, on day t. We use the same benchmarks as in the CARs 
specification.   
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Contrary to earlier US based studies that show a positive announcement market reaction around 
PIPEs, we document negative average announcement returns outside the US and specifically in 
the European and Asian regions, as shown in both announcement windows and both specifications. 
In addition, US PIPEs exhibit lower announcement returns compared to earlier studies that find 
approximately 2% excess returns (Berkman et al., 2016; Floros and Sapp, 2012) and 3.5% to 6% 
excess returns (Brophy et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Dai, 2011) using examination periods 
spanning the years 1995 to 2011. Moreover, Lim et al. (2018) find higher announcement returns 
(approximately 4%) when focusing on common equity issues.  
Regarding the post-announcement windows, we find a significant long-term underperformance 
following PIPE issues across all regions, with the least underperformance for traditional PIPEs to 
be evident in US and European firms. Structured PIPEs perform worse than traditional PIPEs 
almost across all regions and all time windows. However, the differences between the structured 
and traditional categories are only significant for US and European firms on most windows 
assessed. US structured PIPEs also appear to have the worst long-term performance (+6, +500) 
loosing approximately 70%. This could be due to a permanent dilution caused by convertible 
investors that may push the stock below the fair value to benefit upon conversion (Hillion and 
Vermaelen, 2004). The negative long-term returns following PIPEs are consistent with US 
evidence on PIPEs (Brophy et al., 2009) and is similar to findings on IPOs (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 
1990; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Ritter, 1991) and SEOs (Hillion and Vermaelen, 2004; Spiess 
and Affleck-Graves, 1995). 
)RUUREXVWQHVVZHUHSHDWWKHDQDO\VLVGLYLGLQJWKHVDPSOHLQWR³LQLWLDOLVVXHV´ZKLFKLQFOXGH
RQO\ WKH ILUVW LVVXH RI HDFK FRPSDQ\ DQG ³IROORZ-XS LVVXHV´ ZKLFK LQFOXGH DOO LVVXHV IURP D
company except the first one. We do so to alleviate possible concerns that our results are driven 
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by outliers, as Floros and Sapp (2012) report that PIPEs performance deteriorates across successive 
issues. Alternatively, we assess the returns for a sample that excludes all issues that occurred in 
less than 255 trading days from the previous issue, to avoid confounding effects that may occur 
from multiple events in close periods (Bris, 2005; Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay, 1997). The results, 
presented in Appendix C, are qualitatively similar. When we include only the initial issues the 
returns are marginally better, albeit still negative, across almost all windows and regions, 
suggesting our earlier findings are robust and not driven by outliers. We argue that follow-up issues 
show larger negative returns due to investors having already observed tKHILUPV¶QHJDWLYHORQJ-
run performance following the initial PIPE issue.  
Next, we examine the reasons for the lower (or more negative) announcement returns as 
compared to earlier evidence. As most of the prior studies focus specifically on common stock and 
fixed convertible PIPEs (Berkman et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2010; Dai, 2011) we first assess 
whether the inclusion of all PIPE contracts can explain the lower / negative PIPE announcement 
returns. In Table 6 we assess the announcement returns (-4, +5) by the security type issued and in 
line with our expectations and earlier findings, traditional PIPEs and especially common stock 
issues perform considerably better than the other security types across all regions with the 
exception of European firms that show low negative returns. However, even for those security 
types that perform better, the announcement returns have been decreasing through the years as 
illustrated in Figure 2 and this is consistent globally. For instance, the average announcement 
returns dropped by more than 100% during the last 10 years compared to the first 11 years of our 
sample period. 
³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
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Therefore, the timing of the issues may offer an explanation for the lower returns, since the 
PIPE announcement valuation starts deteriorating from 2004 onwards (Figure 2) and this is evident 
across all security types.  Bengtsson et al. (2014) assessing US PIPEs also document an 
underperformance during 2003-2006 and find PIPE firms to be more distressed compared to earlier 
\HDUVZKLFKWKH\DVVRFLDWHZLWKDVHULHVRI6(&¶VDFWLRQVLQ4 to limit the potential of stock 
price manipulation around PIPEs. However, as the negative shift in the market reaction around 
PIPEs extends to non-US markets, this may extend the possible explanations to non-regulation 
specific outcomes. Panel A of Table 7 presents WKH LVVXHUV¶ IXQGDPHQWDOV EHIRUH DQG DIWHU WKH
negative shift in the announcement returns around PIPEs and confirms that issuers in more recent 
years have significantly worse fundamentals. For instance, a significantly larger proportion of 
firms fall into the distressed category as measured by the Altman (1968) z-score one year prior to 
the PIPE issue13, spend less in R&D and have worse profitability and operating performance.  
³)LJXUHJRHVDERXWKHUH´ 
To alleviate potential concerns regarding the association of financially weak firms and poor 
performance, we assess the announcement returns using a sub-sample of ³ZHDN´ and ³QRW-ZHDN´ 
firms. The weak firms sub-sample comprises firms that have size and M/B lower than the sample 
median, leverage higher than the sample median and z-score below 1.814. The results presented on 
Table 7 Panel B show that the sub-sample of firms with the weaker fundamentals perform 
significantly worse than the not-weak sub-sample, confirming our results on Panel A that PIPEs 
performance can be explained by the GHWHULRUDWLRQRIWKHLVVXLQJILUPV¶IXQGDPHQWDOVFinally, in 
Table 7 Panel C we further assess the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis RQ3,3(V¶ performance 
                                                 
13
 The results are qualitatively similar when we use as a distress proxy, the negative operating income indicator 
variable, which takes the value 1 if the firm has negative operating income before depreciation during the two years 
prior to the PIPE issue and 0 otherwise. 
14
 Alternatively, we consider as weak firms only those with a z-score lower than 1.8 and our results are similar.  
 19 
 
as a potential determinant for the low / negative returns. We split the sample into 3 periods: before, 
during, and after the financial crisis. During the recession years there is a pronounced drop in the 
returns. However, there is no sign of improvement during the years following the financial crisis, 
as the returns keep decreasing. If the negative shift was attributed to the financial crisis, we would 
expect the announcement returns to recover to the levels prior to the recession. Therefore, the 
negative shift in the market reaction around PIPEs can only be partially explained by the financial 
crisis and is mostly driven by the weaker fundamentals of firms issuing PIPEs more recently.  
 ³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
4.2 PIPE Announcement Reaction and Country Level Institutional Characteristics 
In this section we assess whether cross-country differences, including legal structures and country 
level institutional characteristics influence the market reaction of PIPEs across countries. We first 
employ a univariate analysis of differences in the announcement returns across firms with different 
legal origins.  The announcement returns are calculated on a 10-dayV¶ window (-4, +5) around the 
announcement of the PIPE. Table 8 Panel A shows that German civil law firms exhibit positive 
and significant announcement abnormal returns. The differences in the abnormal returns between 
English common law and German civil law firms are also significant. To the extent that the 
German and Scandinavian civil law, impose the highest law enforcement the results suggest that 
PIPEs are benefited by a strong law enforcement environment. 
³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
Next, we run regressions of the announcement returns from firms of different legal origins using 
firm specific and issue specific characteristics, to check whether the results hold after including a 
set of control variables. We use the following model: 
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ܥܣܴ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݊ܽݐ݅݋݊݄ܿܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௝ ൅ ൅ߚଶ כ ݏ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ כ ݈݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସ כ݉ݑ݈ݐ݅݅ݏݏݑ݁ݎ௜ ൅ ߚହ כ ݌ݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ כ ݌ݎ݁ܽ݊݊݋ݑ݊ܿ݁݉݁݊ݐݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ כ݀݅ݏݐݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ כ ܴƬܦ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ ൅ ߴ ൅ ߮  (3) 
Our dependent variable is the average market valuation of the 10 working days surrounding 
the PIPE announcements (CAR
-4, +5). Initially, the independent variable of interest here is the 
nation characteristics which represent the legal origin of the issuing firm. We also include a set of 
ILUPVSHFLILFFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKDWDUHW\SLFDOO\UHSRUWHGWRDIIHFWILUPV¶SHUIRUPDQFH15. Specifically, 
we control for firm size (Fama and French, 1993); leverage (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) (Eckbo 
and Masulis, 1995); R&D (Brown and Floros, 2012); and financial distress (Chaplinsky and 
Haushalter, 2010; Floros and Sapp, 2012) with a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm 
has a z-score lower than 1.8 and 0 otherwise. We also control for multiple PIPE issuers (Floros 
and Sapp, 2012) with a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has issued at least two 
PIPEs during the examination period and 0 otherwise. Moreover, we control for deal specific 
characteristics. In particular, we control for PIPE proceeds (Kalay and Shimrat, 1987); pre-
announcement market performance (CAR
-25, -5); and discount16 offered to investors (Chen et al., 
2010; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Lim et al., 2018; Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Finally, Ȗ, ș, ĳ, are year, industry and issue-type fixed effects 
respectively.  
The results in Table 8 show that countries with a legal origin of German civil law have a better 
market reaction to PIPE announcements even after controlling for firm and issue specific 
                                                 
15
 All financial data are from the fiscal year end prior to the announcement of the PIPE issue. 
16
 In untabulated results we find that PIPEs are offered on an average discount of 5.5% relative to their announcement 
date. This is in line with Lim et al. (2018) who find an average discount of 6.3% suggesting that these discounts are 
offered as a compensation to those willing to invest on financially constrained firms.  
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characteristics. This suggests that issuers in countries with strong law enforcement exhibit higher 
announcement returns. However, legal origin classification is static through the years which can 
lead to a potential bias in our results. Therefore, we assess PIPE returns over several time windows, 
as a function of a set of time variant country governance characteristics. Specifically, as nation 
characteristics in equation (3) we now use the variables ³&RQWUROIRU&RUUXSWLRQ´³5HJXODWRU\
4XDOLW\´ and ³5XOH RI/DZ´.  Control for Corruption measures the corruption in the political 
system; a low score shows low efficiency in the government and business and people assuming 
positions through patronage rather than skills. Regulatory Quality is a measure of the investment 
profile; it assesses the factors affecting the risk to investment including contract viability, profits 
repatriation and payment delays. Rule of law is a proxy for law enforcement. It measures the 
impartiality of the legal system and the compliance to the law. A low score shows that a country 
suffers from high criminality and ignorance to the law while a high score points to a good judicial 
system. The three country governance measures are significantly positively correlated. 
Specifically, there is a strong positive relation between the pair Control for Corruption and 
Regulatory Quality (22%) and the pair Control for Corruption and Rule of Law (41%), explained 
by the fact that countries with low corruption rates typically have a good judicial system17. Hence, 
we include the variable Control for Corruption on different specifications from the ones that 
include the Regulatory Quality and the Rule of Law. 
³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
The results are reported on Table 9. Columns (1) - (4) report the estimates of the regressions on 
PIPE announcement returns, (5) & (6) on short-term returns, (7) & (8) on medium-term returns, 
and (9) & (10) on long-term returns. The results show that better country governance is positively 
                                                 
17
 The correlation matrix for the variables used in the regressions is presented in the Appendix D. 
 22 
 
associated with PIPE announcement returns. Specifically, we see that Control for Corruption, Rule 
of Law and Regulatory Quality coefficients are positive and significant, suggesting that PIPE 
issuers in countries with better governance quality where there is greater transparency, better legal 
UXOHVKLJKHUFRXUWV¶HIILFLHQF\DQGKLJKHULQYHVWRUSURWHFWLRQVRXWSHUIRUPWKHRWKHUV5HJXODWRU\
Quality and Control for Corruption also remain positive and significant after the inclusion of a set 
of control variables. The results are economically significant as we see that a 1% increase in 
Regulatory Quality leads to an increase of 7.8% in the 10-day CARs, while a 1% increase in 
Control for Corruption leads to a 6.4% increase in the CARs over the same window. 
Furthermore, FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH OLWHUDWXUH ZH ILQG VL]H WR EH QHJDWLYHO\ UHODWHG WR ILUPV¶
performance, however, the relationship is not statistically significant. Leverage is negatively 
UHODWHGWRILUPV¶DQQRXQFHPHQWreturns, suggesting that high levels of leverage may be associated 
with firms in poor condition. However, this relationship is soon reversed and we notice a positive 
relationship between leverage and long-term returns in line with the propositions of Eckbo and 
Masulis (1995); Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Modigliani and Miller (1958). In addition, in line 
with our expectations the R&D and proceeds variables are positive and significant, while the multi-
LVVXHU LQGLFDWRU YDULDEOH LV QHJDWLYHO\ UHODWHG WR ILUPV¶ UHWXUQV Furthermore, we find financial 
GLVWUHVVWRQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWILUPV¶SHUIRUPDQFHZKLOHpre-announcement returns do not seem to 
KDYHDVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQ3,3(ILUPV¶YDOXDWLRQV Finally, we find that smaller discounts in which 
private investors purchased the PIPE securities lead to a better market reaction on the issue. This 
suggests that when securities are purchased on a low discount or on a premium, new investors have 
positive expectations over the growth of the issuing companies, while existing shareholders also 
perceive the issue positively as they do not experience high levels of dilution. The fact that the 
Regulatory Quality and the Control for Corruption variables remain positive and significant on the 
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regressions on the announcement returns, highlights that the effect of the discount offered to 
participating investors does not negate the effect of country governance on PIPE valuations. 
Contrary to the results on the announcement returns, country governance characteristics are 
no longer significant when assessing longer time intervals. These results suggest that in countries 
with better governance, where there are better quality investment opportunities for firms to use 
their proceeds and greater investment growth, the market overreacts in the announcement of capital 
raising through PIPEs. However, this positive valuation does not persist in the long-run, as the 
over-reaction is corrected through time and country governance characteristics no longer affect 
PIPEs performance. Eckbo and Masulis (1995) suggest that capital structure change effects are 
unlikely to be closely related to the equity issue in the long-run as they may be offset by subsequent 
corporate actions. The findings confirm our hypotheses. Consistent with our expectations we find 
that firms in countries with higher governance quality, and thus higher transparency and better 
investor protection and monitoring, perform significantly better than their counterparts in countries 
with lower governance quality. Our findings also support the findings of Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998); El Ghoul et al. (2017); Gompers et al. (2003); Hooper et al. (2009); La Porta 
et al. (1998) and Lombardo and Pagano (1999,2000), who associate better governance with higher 
firm valuations. 
4.3 Robustness checks 
As a robustness check, to ensure that the results are not driven by outliers we repeat the regressions 
of Table 9 including a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the PIPE issue is the first PIPE 
issue of that company and 0 otherwise. The results, reported in Table 10, show that the country 
governance variables are qualitatively similar to our previous findings. Meanwhile, the binary 
variable is positive and significant in line with our findings that on average the first PIPE issue for 
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each firm has marginally better (or less negative) performance18. These findings also suggest that 
the markets learn over time, as the positive reaction around the PIPE announcement declines on 
the follow-up PIPE issues. As an alternative robustness check, to ensure our results are not driven 
by a potential clustering of multiple and consecutive PIPE issues, especially in the announcement 
and short-term analysis, we repeat our estimations including in the sample only 1 issue per year19 
for each firm. The results, which are not presented here for brevity, are qualitatively similar.  
³7DEOHJRHVDERXWKHUH.´ 
Finally, we make sure our results are not spurious by performing a placebo event study 
following Andres, Jacob and Ulrich (2018). In particular, we ensure our findings are not resulting 
from general market trends by using as the event day 50 trading days prior to the PIPE 
announcement. We then repeat the regressions of the announcement returns on the national 
characteristics using as the dependent variable the announcement CARs estimated with the placebo 
event day. The results, presented in Table 11, show that the national characteristics (variables of 
interest) are not significant. This confirms the robustness of our results and shows that our findings 
are not due to general market trends suggesting that legal and institutional frameworks play a key 
role in the market valuation of PIPEs.  
³7DEOH goes about here.´ 
5. Conclusion 
This paper documents the market valuation of PIPEs on a global setting between 1995 and 2015. 
Although, these issue types have grown in popularity around the world, we find a decline in the 
market valuation of PIPEs surrounding their announcement, with decreased announcement returns 
                                                 
18
 See Appendix C. 
19
 For this test we exclude all PIPE issues of the same firm that occur within 255 trading days from the previous one. 
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across all regions. This can be attributed to the poor fundamentals of the firms participating in the 
PIPE market more recently. In addition, we provide empirical evidence that the market valuation 
of PIPEs can be explained by differences in institutional characteristics and governance 
frameworks. For instance, we find that the quality of country level governance matters, as the 
market reaction around PIPEs is positively associated with lower governmental corruption rates, 
better regulatory quality and stronger law enforcement.  
These findings are consistent with the law and finance literature suggesting that more effective 
and less corrupt government systems enhance the efficiency of investment and increase equity 
returns. Moreover, we find that smaller and financially distressed firms choose to raise equity 
through PIPEs during the last decade, with this finding to apply globally. Finally, we find that 
PIPEs are followed by a significantly negative stock performance in the long-run. The fact that 
this finding persists on a global setting, suggests that US findings are not driven by a sample bias.  
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Figure 1: PIPE issues and proceeds ($ billion) by region and year 
 
The graph illustrates the number of PIPE deals and their respective proceeds in $ billion from 1995 to 2015 by region 
and year.  Data of PIPE activity and proceeds are employed from Sagient Research - Placement Tracker. 
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Figure 2: Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Returns  by year 
 
The figure illustrates the cumulative average abnormal returns on a  GD\V¶ ZLQGRZ -4, +5) around the 
announcement of the PIPE issues by issue type. Panel A includes all PIPE types while Panel B includes only common 
stock and fixed price convertible PIPEs. Issues are categorized into US and non-86DFFRUGLQJWRWKHLVVXHUV¶QDWLRQ
Stock data for US firms are retrieved from the CRSP database and for non-US firms from Thomson Reuters database. 
Abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99%. 
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Table 1: Sample selection 
All issues 1995-2015 39,249 100% 
Financial Firms -3,665 
-9% 
OTC  -11,238 
-29% 
Legal structure: Rule 144-A  -1,411 
-4% 
Legal structure: Reg. S.  -185 0% 
Legal structure: Secondary Private -165 0% 
Security type: Common Stock - Shelf Sale (Registered Direct) -761 
-2% 
Security type: Common Stock - CMPO/Overnight Offering) -444 
-1% 
No financial data -10,903 
-28% 
Depositary Receipts -69 0% 
Total 10,408 27% 
The table presents a breakdown of the sample selection process. 
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Table 2:   PIPE deals characteristics 
Nation Number 
of PIPEs 
PIPEs 
per 
firm 
(max) 
Number 
of firms 
PIPEs 
per 
firm 
(mean) 
Total 
Proceeds 
mil. $ 
Proceeds 
per firm 
mil. $ 
(max) 
Proceeds 
per firm 
mil.$ 
(mean) 
United States 2,747 37 1,045 3 128,000 4,000 122 
Global non-US 7,661 19 3,411 2 274,400 14,000 80 
Total 10,408 37 4,456 2 402,400 14,000 90 
Region: America Excl. US 
    
Argentina 1 1 1 1 24 24 24 
Bermuda 35 8 8 4 2,420 250 303 
Brazil 1 1 1 1 450 450 450 
Canada 2,411 19 1,013 2 33,500 1,800 33 
Cayman Isl. 1 1 1 1 26 26 26 
Mexico 1 1 1 1 70 70 70 
Total 2,450 19 1,025 2 36,490 1,800 36 
Region: Asia-Pacific 
      
Australia 2,495 14 1,032 2 55,800 3,200 54 
China 47 4 29 2 2,040 770 70 
Hong Kong 794 11 403 2 40,100 2,400 100 
India 4 1 4 1 402 180 101 
Israel 11 3 8 1 169 47 21 
Japan 15 11 3 5 2,130 1,600 710 
Malaysia 8 4 5 2 56 20 11 
New Zealand 6 1 6 1 249 230 42 
Philippines 4 1 4 1 628 380 157 
Singapore 10 1 10 1 1,950 1,000 195 
Taiwan 7 3 5 1 776 360 155 
Un. Arab Emir. 2 1 2 1 641 640 321 
Total 3,403 14 1,511 2 104,941 3,200 69 
Region: Europe 
      
Austria 1 1 1 1 45 45 45 
Belgium 14 3 9 2 6,010 5,500 668 
Cyprus 1 1 1 1 79 79 79 
Finland 1 1 1 1 1,900 1,900 1,900 
France 14 3 11 1 1,010 450 92 
Germany 15 3 11 1 4,250 2,700 386 
Greece 4 2 3 1 436 200 145 
Ireland 43 19 15 3 1,440 300 96 
Italy 10 4 2 5 109 34 55 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 340 340 340 
Monaco 5 2 4 1 212 150 53 
Netherlands 8 2 6 1 4,420 3,100 737 
Norway 11 2 10 1 1,490 700 149 
Russia 2 1 2 1 205 190 103 
Spain 3 1 3 1 189 100 63 
Sweden 20 4 13 2 505 190 39 
Switzerland 5 3 3 2 118 43 39 
Un. Kingdom 1,650 15 779 2 104,000 14,000 134 
Total 1,808 19 875 2 126,758 14,000 145 
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The table reports the summary statistics of all PIPE deals from 1995 to 2015 in my sample with available data on 
DataStream (non-US firms) and CRSP (US firms). The issues are categorized E\WKHILUPV¶UHJLRQRIRSHUDWLRQ)RU
each country the total number of PIPE issues is presented as well as the maximum and the average number of PIPE 
deals per firm along with their respective proceeds. All the proceeds are shown in million US dollars. 
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Table 3: PIPE issuers' distribution 
Panel A: Region classification No. of firms % 
America Excl. US 1,025 23.00 
Asia-Pacific 1,511 33.91 
Europe 875 19.64 
United States 1,045 23.45 
Panel B: FF 12 industry classification No. of firms % 
Consumer Non-Durables 150 3.49 
Consumer Durables 79 1.84 
Manufacturing  214 4.98 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 485 11.28 
Chemicals and Allied Products 68 1.58 
Business Equipment 528 12.28 
Telephone and Television Transmission 77 1.79 
Utilities 99 2.3 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 237 5.51 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs 418 9.73 
Other, Mines, Construction, Transportation 1,943 45.21 
Panel C: PIPE type classification No. of firms % 
Traditional  4,162 93.4 
Structured 294 6.6 
Panel D: Legal Origin classification No. of firms % 
English 4,332 97.22 
French 46 1.03 
German 52 1.17 
Scandinavian 24 0.54 
The table presents the distribution characteristics of PIPE issuers from 1995 to 2015. Panel A shows the distribution 
RI3,3(LVVXHUVE\ILUPV¶UHJLRQRIRSHUDWLRQ3DQHO%VKRZVWKHLVVXHUV¶LQGXVWU\GLVWULEXWLRQEDVHGRQWKH)DPD-
French 12 industry classification system. Panel C presents the distribution of PIPE deals into traditional and structured. 
3DQHO'VKRZVWKHOHJDORULJLQGLVWULEXWLRQE\LVVXHUV¶QDWLRQIROORZLQJWKHFODVVLILFDWLRQRILa Porta et al. (1998). 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: PIPE firms' characteristics 
Region Market 
Value 
M/B Leverage  Cash R&D  Enterprise 
Value  
Cash burn ROA (%) CAR 
(-25,-5) (%) 
America 
Excl. US 
181,160 2.68 0.25 0.27 0.11 9.62 -7.98 -72.09 0.47*** 
(22,735) (1.42) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (1.57) (0.75) (-16.27) (-0.65) 
2,178 2,009 2,264 2,222 2,280 2,159 1,949 2,272 2,066 
Asia-Pacific 282,788 2.58 0.22 0.29 0.03 2.41 -2.58 -47.86 2.50*** 
(33,213) (1.40) (0.01) (0.20) (0.00) (1.14) (-0.31) (-11.34) (0.44) 
3,227 3,242 3,327 3,317 3,340 3,224 3,245 3,314 3,207 
Europe 561,594 2.67 0.19 0.23 0.07 2.38 -3.72 -43.98 -1.01*** 
(44,914) (1.55) (0.05) (0.13) (0.00) (1.10) (-0.30) (-9.75) (-0.88) 
1,551 1,564 1,628 1,606 1,629 1,548 1,580 1,630 1,539 
United 
States 
694,465 3.93 0.25 0.36 0.23 3.51 -8.17 -58.78 0.11*** 
(91,179) (2.49) (0.14) (0.25) (0.07) (1.72) (-0.58) (-32.54) (-0.33) 
2,323 2,245 2,403 2,393 2,406 2,303 2,237 2,406 2,355 
Total: All 
regions 
408,600 2.95 0.23 0.29 0.10 4.37 -5.33 -55.65 0.84*** 
(41,841) (1.61) (0.02) (0.19) (0.00) (1.33) (-0.45) (-15.12) (-0.25) 
9,279 9,060 9,622 9,538 9,635 9,234 9,011 9,622 9,167 
Panel B: PIPE firms' default probability 
Region % of firms in "unsafe" zone % of firms with neg. operating income    
America Excl. US 85.66 68.95 
 
 
Asia-Pacific 84.42 69.98 
 
 
Europe 82.87 54.99 
 
 
United States 81.45 55.45    
3DQHO$UHSRUWVWKHPHDQPHGLDQVDUHUHSRUWHGLQWKHSDUHQWKHVHVYDOXHVRI3,3(LVVXHUV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRYHUWR E\ILUPV¶UHJLRQ)LQDQFLDOGDWDDUH
retrieved from Worldscope database and are from the fiscal year prior to the PIPE issue. Numbers in italic represent the total observations for each category. Market 
value is shown in thousand US dollars. The M/B is the market to book item from DataStream, leverage is the ratio of total debt over total assets, cash is computed as 
cash and cash equivalents over total assets, R&D is the ratio of research and development over total assets, Enterprise value is the ratio of enterprise value over total 
assets, cash burn is the ratio of operating income before depreciation over cash and cash equivalents if the firm has negative operating income and 0 otherwise, ROA 
is the return on assets computed at the ratio of net income over total assets and CAR (-25, -5) shows the cumulative abnormal returns over trading day -25 to -5 prior 
to the PIPE announcement. Panel B shows the percentage of PIPE firms with a z-score lower than 1.8 one year before the PIPE issue and the percentage of firms that 
have negative operating income during the two years prior to the issue proxying for financial distress. All financial data are winsorized at the 1 and 99%. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 5: PIPEs performance 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns                   
 
America Excl: US Asia Pacific Europe United States 
 
Tradit- 
ional % 
Struct- 
ured % 
Diff. 
in 
means 
Tradit- 
ional % 
Struct- 
ured % 
Diff. in 
means 
Tradit- 
ional % 
Struct- 
ured % 
Diff. in 
means 
Tradit- 
ional % 
Struct- 
ured % 
Diff. in 
means 
(-4,+5) 1.88*** -1.80*** 3.68 -0.93*** -2.13*** 1.20 -2.20*** -2.59*** 0.38 2.28*** -4.28*** 6.56*** 
 
(-0.25) (-0.20) 
 
(-1.76) (-1.76)   (-1.73) (-1.99)   -0.16 (-4.00) 
 
(+6,+100 -14.47*** -5.22*** -9.24 -12.48*** -29.16*** 16.67*** -10.63*** -16.79*** 6.16 -12.59*** -25.25*** 12.67*** 
 
(-13.82) (-3.25) 
 
(-11.15) (-28.57)   (-9.61) (-15.92)   (-10.63) (-20.36) 
 
(+6,+250 -38.89*** -24.60*** -14.29 -32.51*** -48.33*** 15.81 -28.19*** -42.40*** 14.22* -32.56*** -55.74*** 23.19*** 
 
(-36.72) (-18.54) 
 
(-32.09) (-35.11)   (-21.83) (-30.16)   (-27.11) (-42.85) 
 
(+6,+500 -80.02*** -63.12*** -16.9 -64.85*** -69.61*** 4.76 -55.16*** -81.53*** 26.36*** -57.90*** -92.47*** 34.57*** 
  (-76.11) (-55.27) 
 
(-61.64) (-46.87)   (-42.87) (-52.01)   (-47.51) (-70.56)   
Panel B: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns                 
 
America Excl: US Asia Pacific Europe United States 
  Tradit- 
ional % 
Struct- 
ured % 
Diff. 
in 
means 
Tradit- 
ional % 
Struct- 
ured % 
Diff. in 
means 
Tradit- 
ional % 
Struct- 
ured % 
Diff. in 
means 
Tradit- 
ional % 
Struct- 
ured % 
Diff. in 
means 
(-4,+5) 0.40*** -2.50*** 2.90 -1.08*** -4.36*** 3.27 -2.24*** -2.49*** 0.25 1.74*** -3.62*** 5.36*** 
 
(-1.61) (-1.03)   (-2.52) (-2.58)   (-2.14) (-2.85)   (-0.50) (-4.26) 
 
(+6,+100 -19.08*** -11.16*** -7.93 -13.13*** -27.29*** 14.16*** -9.34*** -13.81*** 4.47 -11.88*** -22.52*** 10.64*** 
 
(-25.66) (-18.41)   (-18.58) (-27.42)   (-12.47) (-20.24)   (-16.50) (-25.74) 
 
(+6,+250 -38.93*** -33.58*** -5.36 -27.55*** -41.37*** 13.82 -20.91*** -35.50*** 14.59*** -25.27*** -43.67*** 18.40*** 
 
(-52.15) (-43.77)   (-40.53) (-43.47)   (-27.54) (-44.92)   (-34.39) (-50.19) 
 
(+6,+500 -60.01*** -55.66*** -4.35 -47.39*** -38.39*** -9.01 -38.50*** -55.86*** 17.36*** -41.95*** -72.81*** 30.86*** 
  (-74.50) (-61.58)   (-64.44) (-68.22)   (-52.38) (-70.12)   (-52.92) (-78.44)   
The table summarizes WKHPHDQPHGLDQVDUHUHSRUWHGLQWKHSDUHQWKHVHVDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVRI3,3(LVVXLQJILUPVEHWZHHQDQGE\LVVXHUV¶Uegion. The 
mean (median) ARs are computed over four time windows, measured in trading days around the announcement of the PIPE issue. Panel A presents the average 
cumulative abnormal returns. Panel B presents the Average Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns. Abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 6: Announcement returns by security type 
Traditional PIPEs America 
Excl.: US 
Asia Pacific Europe United States 
Common Stock 2.03*** 0.38*** -2.24*** 3.54*** 
 
(-0.25) (-0.78) (-1.73) (1.04) 
Common Stock - Rights Offering 1.17*** -6.15*** -3.37*** -2.35*** 
 
(-0.34) (-6.74) (-3.50) (-2.80) 
Convertible - Fixed -0.65*** 0.26*** -0.88*** 0.90*** 
 
(-0.20) (-0.31) (-0.48) (-0.65) 
Non-Convertible Debt/Pref. Stock 2.57*** 8.37*** 6.99*** -4.10*** 
 
(-0.20) (8.45) (0.52) (-2.52) 
Structured PIPEs         
ATM (At the Market) Offering -4.65*** -13.76*** -2.12*** -4.92*** 
 
(-2.13) (-13.76) (-1.18) (-4.14) 
Common Stock Reset 
   
-3.87*** 
 
   
(-4.26) 
Convertible - Company Instalment 0.03 -4.81*** -5.97*** -11.55*** 
 
(-4.43) (-4.81) (-3.81) (-12.91) 
Convertible - Floating 1.95*** 2.97*** -3.81*** -3.76*** 
 
(2.67) (-3.48) (-3.20) (-5.93) 
Convertible - Reset -3.31*** 2.88*** -3.91*** -2.18*** 
 
(0.08) (3.36) (-0.88) (-4.32) 
Structured Equity Line -0.02 -6.39*** -1.95*** -1.83*** 
  (0.28) (-1.87) (-2.20) (-1.96) 
The table summarizes the mean (median values are shown in the parentheses) abnormal returns of PIPE issuing firms 
EHWZHHQDQGE\LVVXHUV¶UHJLRQDQGLVVXHW\SH7KHPHDQPHGLDQ$5VDUHFRPSXWHGRYHUD-day window 
(-4, +5) around the PIPE announcement. ARs are winsorized at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 7: Announcement returns and issuers' characteristics before and after the performance 
shift 
3DQHO$,VVXHUV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHSHUIRUPDQFHVKLIW 
  1995-2003 2004-2015 diff. (p-value] 
Size 551,470 394,965 156,775** (0.05) 
Leverage 0.21 0.23 -0.02 (0.47) 
Cash 0.33 0.29 0.04*** (0.00) 
Cash burn rate -2.22 -5.58 3.36** (0.04) 
Distressed 0.78 0.84 -0.07*** (0.00) 
Enterprise value 3.97 4.39 -0.42 (0.74) 
R&D 0.19 0.10 0.09*** (0.00) 
EBITDA -0.38 -0.45 0.07*** (0.01) 
CAR (-25,-5) (%) 1.98 0.70 1.28 (0.12) 
CAR (-4,+5) (%) 2.11 -0.45 2.56*** (0.00) 
ROA -0.53 -0.56 0.03 (0.52) 
Panel B: Announcement Returns by firms' financial position   
 Weak Not-weak 
firms 
diff. (p-value) 
CAR (-4,+5) (%) -1.21% 2.76% -3.96* (0.07) 
Panel C: Announcement Returns by region and period     
Period America - Excl.: US Asia - Pacific Europe United States 
1995-2006 3.44%*** -2.66%*** 3.18%*** 1.62%*** 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2007-2009 2.61%*** 0.11% -0.51%*** 0.35%** 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.05) 
2010-2015 1.16%*** -1.26%*** -3.35%*** -1.21%*** 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
3DQHO$SUHVHQWVWKHPHDQYDOXHVRILVVXHUV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFVEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHQHJDWLYHVKLIWLQ the announcement 
returns of PIPEs. Size is the market capitalization in thousand US dollars, leverage is the ratio of total debt over total 
assets, cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents over total assets, cash burn is the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation over cash and cash equivalents if a firm has negative operating income and 0 otherwise, distressed is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has a z-score lower than 1.8 one year prior to the PIPE issue, 
Enterprise value is the ratio of enterprise value over total assets, R&D is the ratio of research and development over 
total assets, EBITDA is the ratio of the earnings before interest tax amortization and depreciation over total assets. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are measured over 2 different day windows around the announcement of the PIPE using 
an OLS market model. ROA is the return on assets computed as the ratio of net income over total assets. Panel B 
shows the cumulative average abnormal returns as measured by the (-ZLQGRZE\ILUPV¶IXQGDPHQWDOV:HDN
firms are considered those that have size and M/B lower than the median of all firms, leverage higher than the median 
of all firms and z-score below 1.8. Panel C shows the announcement cumulative average abnormal returns as measured 
by the (-4, +5) window by time period: before, during and after the financial crisis. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Accounting data are from the fiscal year end prior to the PIPE issue. p-values 
on differences in means are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels.
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Table 8: Announcement returns and legal origins 
Panel A: Differences in means English French German Scandinavian 
Average Announcement Returns (%) -0.20*** 1.38*** 4.28*** -0.09 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) 
F-test - Difference from English law 
 
0.54 4.48** 0.00 
 
 
(0.46) (0.03) (0.98) 
F-test - Difference from French law   0.93 0.14 
   (0.33) (0.71) 
F-test - Difference from German law    1.20 
    (-0.27) 
 
Panel B: Panel Regressions (1) (2) 
French Civil Law 0.02 0.02 
(0.38) (0.62)    
German Civil Law 0.05*** 0.07** 
(0.01) (0.04)    
Scandinavian Civil Law 0.01 0.01 
(0.82) (0.85)    
Size 
 
0.00 
 
 
(0.57)    
Leverage 
 
-0.00*** 
 (0.00)    
Multi-issuer 
 
-0.01 
 (0.43)    
Distressed 
 
-0.02*** 
 (0.00)    
R&D 
 
0.02** 
 (0.01)    
Proceeds 
 
0.00 
 (0.17)    
CAR (-25, -5) 
 
-0.01 
 (0.58)    
Discount 
 
0.07*** 
 (0.00)    
Constant -0.02 -0.04* 
(0.54) (0.09)    
Year effects Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Security type effects Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.04 
Obs. 8,859 5,509 
Panel A presents the average cumulative abnormal returns of PIPE issuers with different legal origins and the F-test 
statistics on the differences among them. The announcement returns are calculated on a 10 day (-4 +5) window around 
the PIPE announcement. Panel B reports the estimates of the panel regressions on the announcement returns (-4, +5) and 
legal origins. Legal origin variables follow the classification of La Porta et al. (1998). Size is measured by the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization, leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets, multi-issuer is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if a firm has issued more than 1 PIPEs during the examination period and 0 otherwise, distressed 
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is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has a z-score lower than 1.8 one year prior to the PIPE issue 
and 0 otherwise, R&D is the ratio of research and development over total assets, proceeds is the ratio of the total proceeds 
over the market capitalization,  CAR (-25, -5) are the cumulative announcement abnormal returns from day -25 up to 
day -5 prior to the PIPE issue, discount is measured as the purchase price over the closing price at the announcement 
date -1. All accounting measures are from the fiscal year end prior to the PIPE issue. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. p-values are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 9: Performance and country governance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Announcement Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
Regulatory Quality 0.08*** 
 
0.07** 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.15 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.49) 
 
Rule of Law 0.08* 
 
0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.29 
 
-0.46 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.97) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.22) 
 
Control for Corruption   0.11*** 
 
0.06*   0.08   0.02 
 
-0.10 
 
  (0.00) 
 
(0.09)   (0.39)   (0.87) 
 
(0.67) 
Size   
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
  
 
(0.60) (0.59) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) 
Leverage   
 
-0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Multi issuer   
 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.07** -0.08** 
 
  
 
(0.30) (0.32) (0.95) (0.90) (0.86) (0.80) (0.05) (0.04) 
Distress   
 
-0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.05** -0.01 0.00 
 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.18) (0.02) (0.03) (0.82) (0.90) 
R&D   
 
0.02** 0.02** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 
  
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.57) (0.62) (0.82) (0.78) (0.52) (0.50) 
Proceeds    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
    (0.12) (0.12) (0.72) (0.70) (0.06) (0.06) (0.28) (0.29) 
CAR (-25, -5)    -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
    (0.57) (0.58) (0.21) (0.22) (0.69) (0.68) (0.74) (0.72) 
Discount    0.07*** 0.07*** 0.04* 0.04* 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant -0.10* -0.04 -0.15*** -0.08** 0.33** 0.18** 1.13*** 0.69*** 1.95*** 1.50*** 
  (0.06) (0.26) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Effects 8,829 8,829 5,493 5,493 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Security type effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.14 
Obs. 8,829 8,829 5,493 5,493 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
The table reports the estimates of the panel regressions on PIPE issuers. Announcement returns are measured using the window (-4, +5) days around the PIPE issue, short, 
medium and long-term returns are measured over the windows (+6, +100), (+6, +250) and (+6, +500) respectively. Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control for 
Corruption data are collected from the ICRG database.  Size is measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalization, leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
multi-issuer is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has issued more than 1 PIPEs during the examination period and 0 otherwise, distressed is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has a z-score lower than 1.8 one year prior to the PIPE issue and 0 otherwise, R&D is the ratio of research and development over 
total assets, proceeds is the ratio of the total proceeds over the market capitalization,  CAR (-25, -5) are the cumulative announcement abnormal returns from day -25 up to 
day -5 relative to the PIPE issue, discount is measured as the purchase price over the closing price at the announcement date -1.  All accounting measures are from the fiscal 
year end prior to the PIPE issue. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust, p-values are shown in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 10: Performance and country governance, first issues robustness check 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Announcement Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
Regulatory Quality 0.07** 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.16 
 
  (0.02) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.46) 
 
Rule of Law 0.05 
 
0.00 
 
-0.29 
 
-0.47 
 
  (0.39) 
 
(0.97) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.20) 
 
Control for Corruption 
 
0.06* 
 
0.08 
 
0.03 
 
-0.11 
  
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.86) 
 
(0.66) 
First issue 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.04* 0.04* 0.06** 0.06** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.62) (0.61) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) 
Leverage -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distress -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.05** 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.19) (0.02) (0.03) (0.89) (0.97) 
R&D 0.02** 0.02** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.58) (0.63) (0.82) (0.78) (0.54) (0.52) 
Proceeds 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.76) (0.74) (0.07) (0.07) (0.28) (0.30) 
CAR (-25, -5) -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  (0.51) (0.52) (0.24) (0.25) (0.73) (0.73) (0.75) (0.73) 
Discount 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.04* 0.04* 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant -0.17*** -0.10*** 0.29** 0.15* 1.09*** 0.64*** 1.90*** 1.44*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Security type effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.14 
Obs. 5,493 5,493 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
The table reports the estimates of the panel regressions on PIPE issuers. Announcement returns are measured over the window (-4, +5) days around the PIPE issue, 
short, medium and long-term returns are measured over the windows (+6, +100), (+6, +250) and (+6, +500) respectively. Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and 
Control for Corruption data are collected from the ICRG database. Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization, leverage is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets, first issue is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the first PIPE of the firm and 0 otherwise, distressed is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm 
has a z-score lower than 1.8 one year prior to the PIPE issue and 0 otherwise, R&D is the ratio of R&D over total assets. Proceeds is the ratio of the total proceeds 
over the market capitalization, CAR (-25, -5) are the cumulative ARs from day-25 to day-5 relative to the PIPE issue, discount is measured as the purchase price 
over the closing price at the announcement date -1. All accounting measures are from the fiscal year end prior to the PIPE issue. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity 
robust, p-values are shown in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels.
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Table 11: Performance and country governance, placebo test 
  (1) (2) 
  Placebo Announcement CAR 
Regulatory Quality -0.03 
 
 
(0.28) 
 
Rule of Law -0.01 
 
 
(0.99) 
 
Control for Corruption 
 
0.00 
  
(0.88) 
Size 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.50) (0.51) 
Leverage 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.79) (0.79) 
Multi issuer -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.12) (0.12) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Distress 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.53) (0.53) 
R&D -0.01*** -0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Proceeds 0.00 0.00 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
CAR (-25, -5) -0.03** -0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.02)    
Discount -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.06 -0.09*** 
  (0.14) (0.00) 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes 
Security type effects Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.02 
Obs. 5,446 5,446 
The table reports the estimates of a placebo test, performed to mitigate the concerns that the results on the 
announcement returns and national characteristics, are driven by market trends. CARs are computed using an OLS 
market model with the placebo event date being 50 trading days prior to PIPE announcement. Announcement returns 
are measured using the window (-4, +5) days around the placebo event. Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control 
for Corruption data are collected from the ICRG database. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization, leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets, multi-issuer is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm has issued more than 1 PIPEs during the examination period and 0 otherwise, distressed is an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 if a firm has a z-score lower than 1.8 one year prior to the PIPE issue and 0 otherwise, 
R&D is the ratio of research and development over total assets. Proceeds is the ratio of the total proceeds over the 
market capitalization, CAR (-25, -5) are the cumulative announcement abnormal returns from day -25 up to day -5 
relative to the placebo event date, discount is measured as the purchase price over the closing price at the announcement 
date -1. All accounting measures are from the fiscal year end prior to the PIPE issue. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity robust, p-values are shown in parentheses. Abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99%. *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Appendix A: Variables definitions 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Source 
Control for 
Corruption 
Control for Corruption measures the corruption in 
the political system. The score ranges from 0 to 1 
with 1 showing the lowest levels of corruption and 
0 showing the highest levels of corruption e.g.: 
low efficiency in government and business, people 
assume position through patronage rather than 
skills. 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
available at: 
info.worldbank.org
/governance/wgi/p
df/PRS.xlsx 
Rule of 
Law 
Rule of Law is measured by two components, the 
law and the order. Law measures the impartiality 
of the legal system and order measures the 
compliance to the law. The score ranges from 0 to 
1 with 0 being the lowest, meaning that the country 
suffers from high criminality and ignorance to the 
law and 1 being a good judicial system.  
International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
available at: 
info.worldbank.org
/governance/wgi/p
df/PRS.xlsx 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Regulatory Quality is a measure of the investment 
profile, it assesses the factors affecting the risk to 
investment and it is derived by 3 components: 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
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contract viability, profits repatriation and payment 
delays. The score ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 
showing very high risk and 1 showing very low 
risk.  
available at: 
info.worldbank.org
/governance/wgi/p
df/PRS.xlsx 
Market 
Value  
Market Value is the market price at the end of the 
year multiplied by the common shares outstanding 
(item WC08001).  
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
Market to 
Book 
Market to Book ratio is employed by Datastream 
(item MTBV).  
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream 
Leverage Leverage is the ratio of total debt (item WC03255) 
to total assets (item WC02999). 
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
Cash  Cash is defined as the cash and cash equivalents 
(item WC02005) over total assets. 
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
R&D  R&D is defined as the ratio of research and 
development (item WC01201) over total assets. 
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
Cash burn Cash burn ratio is defined as the ratio of operating 
income before depreciation (item WC18155) over 
cash and cash equivalents. This ratio is set to zero 
LI WKH ILUP¶V RSHUDWLQJ LQFRPH LV SRVLWLYH LQ WKH
fiscal year end prior to the PIPE issue. 
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
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Distressed  Distressed is an indicator variable that takes the 
value 1 if a firm has a z-score (Altman, 1968) 
lower than 1.8 one year prior to the PIPE 
announcement and 0 otherwise. 
 
Size Size is defined as the natural logarithm of market 
value.  
 
Dilution Dilution is calculated as follows: for common 
stock deals: [(Number of Securities Sold) + 
(Amount of Warrants)] / (Closing Shares 
Outstanding), for Fixed Convertible deals: [(Gross 
Proceeds / Fixed Conversion Price) + (Amount of 
Warrants)] / (Closing Shares Outstanding), for 
Floating Convertible deals: [(Gross Proceeds / 
Closing Market Price) + (Amount of Warrants)] / 
(Closing Shares Outstanding), for Non-
Convertible deals: (Amount of Warrants) / 
(Closing Shares Outstanding), for Structured 
Equity Lines: [(Commitment Amount/Market 
Price at Closing) + (Amount of Warrants)] / 
(Closing Shares Outstanding), for At-the-Market 
deals: (Amount of Warrants, if any) / (Closing 
Shares Outstanding).  
Sagient Research 
Placement Tracker 
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Proceeds Proceeds are defined as the gross proceeds scaled 
by the market capitalization. 
Sagient Research 
Placement Tracker 
Discount Discount is calculated as follows: [(Purchase 
Price Per Share) / (Closing Market Price) ± 
1]*100 
Sagient Research 
Placement Tracker 
Enterprise 
value 
Enterprise value is defined as the ratio of 
enterprise value (item WC18100) over total assets. 
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
EBITDA  EBITDA is defined as the ratio of Earnings Before 
Interest, Taxes & Depreciation (item WC18198) 
over total assets.  
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
ROA Return on Assets is the ratio of net income (item 
WC01751) over total assets.  
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
Multi-issuer Multi-issuer is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a firm has issued at least 2 PIPEs 
during the period 1995-2015 and 0 otherwise.  
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Appendix B: Legal origins classification 
Country Legal origin Country Legal origin 
Argentina French Japan English 
Australia English Luxembourg French 
Austria German Malaysia English 
Belgium French Mexico French 
Bermuda English Monaco French 
Brazil French Netherlands French 
Canada English New Zealand English 
Cayman Islands English Norway Scandinavian 
China German Philippines French 
Cyprus French Russia (Socialist) 
Finland German Singapore English 
France French Spain French 
Germany German Sweden Scandinavian 
Greece French Switzerland German 
Hong Kong English Taiwan German 
India English United Arab Emirates English 
Ireland English United Kingdom English 
Israel English United States English 
Italy French     
The table presents the legal origin break-down of the firms in my sample. For the legal origins of each country I 
follow the classification employed by La Porta et al. (1998) and categorize countries into English common law, 
French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law. For countries that are not classified in La Porta et 
al. (1998) study, I collect the legal origins data from the World Factbook website. Russian issuing firms are excluded 
from the legal origin tests, due to the scarcity of observations with socialist legal origin. There are only 2 unique 
firms issuing 2 PIPEs with a socialist legal origin in my dataset.
 51 
 
Appendix C: Cumulative abnormal returns ± sub samples 
  Traditional PIPEs Structured PIPEs 
CARs (-4, +5) (+6, +100) (+6, +250) (+6, +500) (-4, +5) (+6, +100) (+6, +250) (+6, +500) 
Panel A: All issues 
  
  
    
America Excl: US 1.889*** -14.479*** -38.899*** -80.029*** -1.80*** -5.22*** -24.60*** -63.12*** 
Asia - Pacific -0.939*** -12.489*** -32.519*** -64.859*** -2.13*** -29.16*** -48.33*** -69.61*** 
Europe -2.209*** -10.639*** -28.199*** -55.169*** -2.59*** -16.79*** -42.40*** -81.53*** 
United States 2.289*** -12.599*** -32.569*** -57.909*** -4.28*** -25.25*** -55.74*** -92.47*** 
Panel B: Initial issues 
      
America Excl: US 2.67*** -12.98*** -37.10*** -83.89*** -0.86*** 11.91*** -17.03*** -53.37*** 
Asia - Pacific 0.03*** -10.75*** -25.78*** -48.17*** 2.17*** -27.43*** -32.36*** -59.66*** 
Europe -0.54*** -9.31*** -20.65*** -36.58*** -2.71*** -22.91*** -36.40*** -53.04*** 
United States 1.29*** -12.08*** -33.92*** -55.64*** -2.68*** -27.63*** -63.13*** -102.22*** 
Panel C: Follow up issues 
      
America Excl: US 1.37*** -15.42*** -40.03*** -77.55*** -2.11 -10.94*** -27.12*** -66.37*** 
Asia - Pacific -1.66*** -13.79*** -37.57*** -77.39*** -4.51*** -30.11*** -57.14*** -75.10*** 
Europe -3.73*** -11.83*** -35.10*** -72.22*** -1.74*** -14.99*** -47.83*** -98.90*** 
United States 2.83*** -12.87*** -31.81*** -59.15*** -4.87*** -24.39*** -53.05*** -88.92*** 
Panel D: One issue per year    
America Excl: US 1.79*** -14.44*** -38.74*** -79.77*** -0.99* -6.01*** -26.34*** -64.89*** 
Asia - Pacific -1.04*** -11.71*** -30.61*** -59.94*** -2.57*** -27.74*** -47.39*** -62.45*** 
Europe -1.87*** -11.05*** -27.08*** -51.19*** -1.42*** -16.00*** -43.51*** -74.34*** 
United States 1.78*** -11.84*** -31.42*** -54.55*** -3.34*** -26.68*** -57.77*** -92.20*** 
The table summarizes WKHPHDQDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVRI3,3(LVVXLQJILUPVEHWZHHQDQGE\LVVXHUV¶UHJLRQ7KHPHDQDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVDUHFRPSXted 
over four time windows, measured in trading days around the announcement of the PIPE issue. Stock data for US firms are retrieved from the CRSP and for non-
US firms from Datastream. Abnormal returns are computed using the following OLS market model: ܣܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ܴ௜ǡ௝ǡǡ௧ െ ܽ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ െ ߚ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ כ ܴ௠ǡ௝ǡ௧. For US firms I use as 
a benchmark the CRSP value weighted indices while for non-US firms I use the Datastream country indices. Panel A includes all issues. Panel B includes only 
the first PIPE issue of each firm. Panel C excludes the first PIPE issue of each firm and includes all the following issues. Panel D excludes all issues that occur in 
less than 255 trading days from the previous issue. Abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99%. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels. 
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Appendix D: Correlation matrix 
  CAR 
 (-4,+5) 
CAR 
(+6,+100) 
CAR 
(+6,+250) 
CAR 
(+6,+500) 
Control for 
Corruption 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Size Leverag
e 
Multi 
issuer 
Distress Proc
eeds 
CAR 
 (-25, -
5) 
CAR 
(+6,+100) 
0.06***             
CAR 
(+6,+250) 
0.06***  0.67***            
CAR 
(+6,+500) 
0.07***  0.50*** 0.78***           
Control for  
Corruption 
0.01  0.00 -0.03*** -0.06***          
Regulatory 
Quality 
0.05***  0.01 0.02* 0.04*** 0.22***         
Rule of 
Law 
0.02** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.07*** 0.41*** 0.04***        
Size -0.01 -0.02** -0.02** -0.03** -0.02** 0.00 0.00       
Leverage -0.01  0.00 0.03** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
Multi issuer 0.00  0.01 -0.01 -0.05*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.00 0.00     
Distress -0.03***  0.00 0.01 0.04*** -0.18*** 0.05*** -0.20*** 0.00 0.04*** -0.04***    
R&D 0.03***  0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04*** 0.06*** -0.04*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.00   
Proceeds 0.00  0.00 0.02** 0.02** -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02* 0.01 0.00  
CAR  
(-25, -5) 
0.00  0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 -0.02* -0.03*** -0.01 -0.02 
Discount 0.10*** -0.02** 0.00 0.02* 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02* 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 
The table reports the correlations among the variables used in the regression analysis. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated over the windows [(-4, +5), 
(+6, +100), (+6, +250) and (+6, +500)] around the PIPE announcement. Control for Corruption, Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law data are collected from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalization, leverage is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets, multi-issuer is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has issued more than 1 PIPEs during the examination period and 0 otherwise, distressed 
is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a firm has a z-score lower than 1.8 one year prior to the PIPE issue and 0 otherwise, R&D is the ratio of research 
and development over total assets. Proceeds is the ratio of the total proceeds over the market capitalization, CAR (-25, -5) are the cumulative announcement 
abnormal returns from day -25 up to day -5 relative to the placebo event date, discount is measured as the purchase price over the closing price at the announcement 
date -1. All accounting measures are from the fiscal year end prior to the PIPE issue. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
